



QUÉ
FUNCIONA PARA EL
DESARROLLO

PROJECT TITLE: AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AGENT PROGRAM AND FOLIAR FERTILIZATION.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the effect of the pay structure on selection as well as on performance conditional on selection.

PARTNERS & GRANTS: BASIS – US Aid, 3ei, MIT

METHODOLOGY: Experimental Design

DESCRIPTION: Productivity growth in agriculture –where most of the world’s poor work– is very slow, mostly due to the lack of technology adoption. Low awareness of the best practices is commonly understood to be a problem, and many countries have large cadres of agricultural extension workers (AEWs) to propagate them.

However, AEW programs have been plagued by ineffectiveness, corruption, and moral hazard. In this project we experimentally modify the pay structure for AEWs in two ways: low versus high flat salaries and flat salaries versus performance pay.

We will evaluate the effect of the pay structure on selection as well as on performance conditional on selection. The main outcomes that we will measure are: yields, absence (shirking) of AEW in the field, recommendation of optimal inputs versus inputs with supplier kickbacks, and shirking in AEWs reporting to the central office.

MAIN FINDINGS:

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PUBLICATIONS/REPORTS/NEWS: